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Abstract 
This paper investigates the determinants of home bias 
in consumption in the beer and wine markets across 
15 ‘old’ member states of the European Union (EU) 
during the period 2000-2009. Two main results are 
obtained using a theory-driven gravity equation. 
Firstly, the home bias in beer consumption is several 
orders of magnitude higher than that of wine. Second-
ly, and interestingly, consumer preferences seem to be 
driving the home bias in the wine sector. In contrast, 
the home bias in beer is widely attributable to the 
home market effect, namely firms tend to localize near 
the consumers in order to minimize the high trade 
costs associated with beer exports. 
Key Words 
border effect; home market effect; preferences; wine 
and beer trade 
Zusammenfassung 
Der Beitrag analysiert die Bestimmungsfaktoren der 
Präferenz für heimisches Bier und heimischen Wein in 
den 15 alten EU Mitgliedsstaaten zwischen 2000-
2009. Unser theoriebezogenes “Gravitationsmodell” 
führt zu zwei Hauptschlussfolgerungen. Erstens liegt 
die Heimatsmarkt-Präferenz für Bierkonsum um meh-
rere Größenordnungen höher als jene für Wein. Zwei-
tens spielen interessanterweise die Vorlieben der Ver-
braucher eine ausschlaggebende Rolle für die Hei-
matsmarkt-Präferenz im Weinsektor. Im Biersektor 
dagegen ist die Präferenz für nationales Bier dem 
Heimatsmarkt-Effekt zuzuschreiben: um hohe Trans-
portkosten zu vermeiden, haben Brauereien die Ten-
denz sich in der Nähe der Endverbraucher niederzu-
lassen.  
Schlüsselwörter 
Grenz-Effekt; Heimatmarkt-Effekt; Präferenzen; Wein- 
und Bierhandel 
1  Introduction 
The disproportionate market share of domestic prod-
ucts over products coming from the international mar-
ket is a subject that occurs frequently in the literature 
on international trade. This “home bias” in consump-
tion, or “border effect”, has been documented both 
across and within countries, showing that within coun-
try trade is disproportionally higher than cross-border 
trade (MCCALLUM, 1995; ANDERSON and VAN WIN-
COOP, 2003). For example, the seminal contribution of 
MCCALLUM (1995) showed that trade between two 
Canadian provinces was on average 22 times (or 
2200%!) greater than their trade with US states, after 
allowing for size and transport costs. 
This intriguing finding subsequently stimulated 
research to assess the relative importance of border 
effect on international as well as intra-national trade. 
At the same time, a large body of literature has inves-
tigated the main reasons behind the border effect, 
focusing in particular on three main determinants 
(CHEN, 2004): (i) border costs related to policy barri-
ers (tariff and non-tariff barriers); (ii) consumer home 
bias in preference; (iii) supply-side factors such as co-
location of intermediate and final goods firms, and 
specialization forces due to globalization (HILLBER-
RY, 2002; ANDERSON and YOTOV, 2010).  
The small number of papers that have investigat-
ed the determinants of border effect in the beer and 
wine sectors have specifically focused on consumer 
preferences and taste, without paying much attention 
to supply-side conditions and the forces of globalisa-
tion (see LOPEZ and MATSCHKE, 2007; FRIBERG et 
al., 2011). However, in recent decades both sectors 
have experienced a strong process of internationalisa-
tion requiring further investigation into the causes 
determining the border effect. 
The aim of this paper is to estimate the border ef-
fect in the beer and wine sectors across the European 
Union (EU) markets. More specifically, the property 
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of the common market, characterized by no virtual 
presence of policy related border barriers (tariffs and 
NTBs) and exchange rate volatility,1 is examined in 
order to investigate the role of consumer preferences 
as opposed to other important explanations of the 
border effect, stemming from firms localization 
choices, a phenomenon that has rarely been investi-
gated in the agri-food sector.  
The focus on the beer and wine market  two im-
portant sectors for many EU countries  has several 
potential advantages. Firstly, these two sectors have 
experienced an intensive globalization process, alt-
hough in quite different ways. Globalisation in the 
wine market has primarily come about through a pro-
cess of trade integration. In contrast, the level of trade 
integration in the beer market is significantly lower, 
and the process of internationalization is primarily due 
to direct foreign investment (FDI) (SWINNEN, 2011). 
Secondly, the beer and wine sectors also present dif-
ferences in conditions of supply and demand. In fact, 
while the two sectors are both traditionally based on 
small and medium enterprises, with important geo-
graphical links, the beer market worldwide has recent-
ly experienced a significant increase in industry con-
centration through intense transnational acquisitions 
and mergers. Furthermore, beer and wine consump-
tion patterns have changed significantly in the last 20 
years (COLEN and SWINNEN, 2010). In many “beer-
drinking nations” such as Belgium, Germany, and the 
UK, the relative share of beer in total alcohol con-
sumption is declining whereas that of wine is increas-
ing. In parallel, the trend is exactly the opposite in 
“wine-drinking nations” such as France, Spain, and 
Italy.  
These differences in supply and demand condi-
tions as well as in globalization patterns offer an ideal 
case study or a quasi-natural experiment to investigate 
the role played by consumer preferences versus sup-
ply-side conditions in explaining the border effect. 
More specifically, the main aim of this paper is to 
contrast the traditional explanation of the border ef-
fect, linked to consumers preferences (home bias in 
preferences), with the alternative based on the choice 
of localisation made by firms in order to minimize 
trade costs – the so-called ‘home market effect’ hy-
pothesis (see KRUGMAN, 1980; CAFISO, 2011). This 
                                                            
1  This is only partially true as the European Monetary Union 
(EMU) actually involves 12 of the 15 ‘old’ EU member states. 
However, the only paper investigating the effect of exchange 
rate volatility on the border effect is that of CHEN (2004) who 
before the formation of the European Monetary Union (EMU), 
did not find any relevant effects among the EU countries.  
issue is investigated using a theory-driven gravity 
equation applied to bilateral beer and wine trade flows 
across 15 ‘old’ EU member states during the period 
2000-2009. 
The contribution of this paper lies in the clarifica-
tion of the relationship between the magnitude of the 
border effect and its main determinants in two im-
portant food sectors. Hypotheses are postulated about 
these relationships, and whether or not these hypothe-
ses are supported by the data is verified. Moreover, 
the analysis of the border effect in the beer and wine 
sectors provides us with potentially useful insight for 
business and policy makers. 
The paper is organised as follows. After a syn-
thetic review of previous evidence, Section 2 presents 
basic hypotheses and predictions about the expected 
determinants of border effect in the beer and wine 
markets. The gravity equation used in the empirical 
analysis is derived in section 3 and the identification 
strategy is discussed. Section 4 introduces the data 
and the empirical strategy. Section 5 presents the 
econometric results. Finally, concluding comments 
are made in section 6.  
2  Background and Hypotheses  
2.1  Previous Evidence 
From a theoretical point of view the border effect is a 
mix of two combined effects: the elasticity of substitu-
tion between varieties produced in different countries, 
and the tariff equivalent of border costs (see EVANS, 
2003; ANDERSON and VAN WINCOOP, 2003).2 The 
component of the border effect related to the elasticity 
of substitution is generally overlooked because it con-
cerns the preferences of individuals. Interest is largely 
focused on border impediments to trade (CAFISO, 
2011). However, it is a fact that in empirical estima-
tions of the border effect based on trade data and the 
gravity equation, the resulting border effect is a mix of 
these two factors but disentangling their role is im-
portant because the economic implication of the bor-
der effect is totally different when home bias in con-
                                                            
2  As originally stressed by EVANS (2003), and more recently 
restated by CAFISO (2011), in the extreme case in which there 
are no border-related trade costs, a border effect can still 
emerge when consumers are biased towards domestic products 
(high elasticity of substitution). In this case, the border effect 
functions more as an indicator of home bias in preferences 
than an indicator of trade integration with respect to border re-
lated trade costs (see CAFISO, 2011: 2). This is the reason why 
the two terms “border effect” and ”home bias in consumption” 
in the literature are often used with similar meaning.  
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sumer preferences rather than border related costs is 
the main driver of the trade reduction effect of national 
borders.  
Table 1 reports a representative sample of studies 
investigating the role of different border effect expla-
nations. While the evidence does not offer a clear 
picture of the key determinants of the border effect, 
some stylized facts are apparent. Firstly, many studies 
focusing on the manufacturing industry have shown 
that a significant role is played by the choice of locali-
sation made by firms due to the so-called home mar-
ket effect (HILLBERRY, 2002; EVANS, 2003, 2007; 
CHEN, 2004; CAFISO, 2011). The importance of policy 
related border costs such as tariffs and NTBs is also 
relevant but significantly less than the apriori expecta-
tion (HEAD and MAYER, 2000; EVANS, 2003, 2007; 
FONTAGNÉ et al., 2005; CHEN, 2004). However, only 
a few studies on manufacturing have found that con-
sumer home bias in preferences played a relevant role 
(HEAD and MAYER, 2000; FONTAGNÉ et al., 2005).  
The situation in the few studies focused on food 
products is quite different. In line with food industry 
expectations  given the pervasiveness of trade pro-
tection  a prominent role is played by policy related 
border costs, followed by consumer home bias in 
preferences. However, supply-side conditions such as 
choices of localization made by firms and vertical 
specialization, appear to be less relevant and, above 
all, have rarely been investigated (LOPEZ et al., 2006; 
OLPER and RAIMONDI, 2008a, b). Moreover, the im-
portance of home bias in preferences is apparent in  
the two studies that analyzed the border effect at 
brand level in the beer and wine sectors (LOPEZ and 
MATSCHKE, 2007; FRIBERG et al., 2011). 
From this brief overview of the actual evidence it 
can be seen that in the case of food products, other 
than policy related border costs, the main source of 
the national border effect is indeed consumer home 
bias in preferences. In contrast, when the industry 
sector is considered, the home market effect plays a 
significant role. This paper shows that this conclusion 
is largely driven by aggregation bias. Indeed, working 
at the disaggregate level, and considering particular 
products, such as beer, it is in fact the case that the 
home market effect is an important driver of the trade 
reduction effect induced by national borders. 
2.2  Firm Localization Choice, Home  
Market Effect, and National Border  
As pointed out above, one potential explanation for 
the trade reduction effect of the national border lies in 
the behavioural response of firms to trade costs 
(CHEN, 2004). Among others, this effect was recently 
investigated by CAFISO (2011), who detected a close 
negative correlation between the industrial geographic 
concentration and the magnitude of the border effect 
across the EU countries. The underlying logic is the 
following. In a standard new economic geography 
(NEG) model, profit maximizing firms with increas-
ing return to scale tend to locate close to consumers in 
order to avoid or minimize trade costs. Thus, countries 
with the highest consumption of beer such as Belgium 
or Germany will have a trade surplus in beer because 
they host a more than proportional share of firms pro-
Table 1. Determinants of the border effect: previous evidence 
  # Industry/  sectors 
Trade 
flow/market 
Tariffs  
& NTBs 
Consumer  
home bias 
Localization 
(HME) 
HEAD and MAYER (2000) 120 industries EU-intra + ++ 
HILLBERRY (2002) 142 industries US-intra ++ 
FONTAGNÉ et al. (2005) 26 industries US-EU-JAP + ++ 0 
EVANS (2003) 8-12 industries OECD + 0 ++ 
EVANS (2007) 7 industries OECD + 0 ++ 
CAFISO (2011) 20 industries EU-intra 0 ++ 
CHEN (2004) 78 industries EU-intra + 0 ++ 
LOPEZ et al. (2006) 33 food  US-import ++ + + 
OLPER and RAIMONDI (2008a) 18 food  Quad-trade ++ ++ 
OLPER and RAIMONDI (2008b) 18 food  Quad-trade ++ ++ + 
LOPEZ and MATSCHKE (2007) 30 beer brands  US-sales ++ 
FRIBERG et al. (2010) 1444 wine brands  NH-sales 0 ++   
Notes:  the table reports the results of a representative sample of published papers studying the determinants of the border effect in different 
countries and industries. (+) indicates that the respective determinant was statistically significant, but does not explain a large 
fraction of the border effect; (++) when the respective determinant also explain an important fraction of the border effect; 
(0) when the respective effect is not statistically significant; a blank means that the respective determinant was not investigated.  
Source: authors’ compilation 
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ducing beer in comparison with the respective domes-
tic consumption. This logic is just what the monopo-
listic competition trade literature has called the ‘home 
market effect’ (HME) (KRUGMAN, 1980). Moreover, 
note that the concentration of production in a particu-
lar region may also be the result of positive externali-
ties due to (Marshallian) external economies of scale 
at the industry level (OTTAVIANO at al., 2002). What-
ever the reasons, the result is that the production sur-
plus is then exported abroad to those countries in 
which domestic production is not sufficient to cover 
domestic consumption. Thus, the border effect ac-
counts for the size of this surplus relative to domestic 
consumption. According to this mechanism, the high-
er the concentration, the smaller the border effect, and 
vice versa. From this point of view, the border effect 
is endogenous because it is due to the firms localiza-
tion decisions (see CAFISO, 2011; HILLBERRY, 2002; 
WOLF, 2000). 
2.3  Preferences, Home Market Effect,  
and National Border:  
A Quasi-Natural Experiment  
In practice, for several reasons empirically isolating 
the role played by the home market effect from other 
potential border effect explanations such as home bias 
in preferences and the policy component is difficult.3  
Firstly, due to data limitations, measuring the geo-
graphical concentration of production is quite a diffi-
cult task.4 Secondly, further identification issues are 
raised within this logic because the border effect is 
endogenous to the location decisions made by firms.  
Finally, due to political economy motives, put an in-
dex of geographical concentration on the right-hand-
side of a gravity model can add a further endogeneity 
problem. This is because there is consolidated evi-
dence showing that the geographical concentration of 
production is positively related to the level of trade 
protection (see TREFLER, 1993; OLPER and RAIMON-
DI, 2008b). Thus, the geographical concentration in-
dex can hardly be used, unambiguously, to detect the 
role played by firm localization decision and HME, in 
a gravity-like equation. For all of these reasons, a 
different strategy is used in this paper to isolate the 
role played by the home market effect compared to 
                                                            
3   For a conceptual discussion about the problems identifying the 
HME empirically, see DAVIS and WEINSTEIN (2003). 
4  The paper of CAFISO (2011) is a relevant exception. However, 
as explained in his data appendix, measuring geographical 
concentration at the industry level across EU countries re-
mains problematic due to data limitation.  
the preference component of the border effect. The 
underlying idea is simple: to exploit key differences in 
beer and wine markets that make it possible to formu-
late some apriori expectations about which type of 
border effect explanations should have the most influ-
ence in the two sectors. Then, through a gravity mod-
el, whether or not these hypotheses hold true in the 
data can be tested. 
Three interrelated peculiarities of the beer and 
wine sectors make this possible: the pattern of interna-
tionalisation, the level of trade costs, and lastly, spe-
cific supply side conditions. Starting from key differ-
ences in internalization patterns, figures 1 and 2 report 
the evolution in the beer and wine sectors of the pro-
duction, trade (export), and trade over production for 
the EU market. The ratio of trade over production (in 
quantity) for wine was about 52% in 2007, but only 
18% for beer. Thus, while both sectors display a sig-
nificant growth in the level of production and trade, 
what is striking are the huge differences in the level of 
trade integration, with the wine market being much 
more integrated than beer, although the latter has ex-
perienced faster growth than the former, especially in 
the last decade. What are the main reasons for these 
marked differences? In what follows it is argued that 
there are essentially two reasons: differences in trade 
costs or transportability, and constraints on supply 
side conditions.  
Trading in beer is costly because the unit price of 
beer is low and so it is like transporting ‘water’. The 
weight to value ratio of beer is several times higher 
than that of wine.5 Therefore, in order to reduce trade 
costs, beer producers tend to locate near their con-
sumers through intensive FDI. The final consideration 
can be seen in table 2. For example, three of the major 
players in the EU beer markets – AbInbev, Heineken, 
and Carlsberg – have intensive production of their 
respective own brands in the host countries. This is 
also clearly a consequence of the great degree of in-
dustrialization of the beer production process.  
On the other hand, the situation in the wine sector 
is quite different. As a result of several constraints on 
the production side – ranging from climatic and soil 
conditions to protected designation of origin (PDO) 
regulations – producing wine abroad it is not often a 
real option for the majority of the (small) wine pro-
                                                            
5  In the period under study and considering the total EU trade, 
the average unit value for beer was about 0.85 €/litre com-
pared to a value of about 2.77 €/litre for wine. This means that 
the transportability (weight to value ratio) of wine is more 
than 3 times higher than that of beer.   
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ducers. This is not to say that FDI in the wine industry 
is unimportant, but it is clearly not possible to produce 
“Bordeaux” or “Brunello di Montalcino” near Ameri-
can or Russian consumers. Therefore, French and 
Italian wine producers must export these wines.  
These differences in the beer and wine markets 
offer an ideal case study to investigate the role played 
by consumer preferences vs. home market effect in 
explaining the border effect. This is because we know 
apriori which kind of border effect explanation should 
be ruled out. Indeed, as discussed above, because 
wine producers find several constraints to localize 
abroad their production, the HME hypothesis should 
be irrelevant, and the bulk of the border effect expla-
nation should be found in the consumer home bias in 
preferences, ceteris paribus. In contrast, the low 
transportability of the beer associated with the im-
portant role played by FDI, and also as a consequence 
of there being few constraints on the production side, 
suggests that the HME hypothesis should be relevant 
in explaining the beer border effect. The next section 
of this paper describes the strategy used to test these 
two hypotheses empirically.  
3  Theory and the  
Empirical Approach  
The gravity equation is based on the monopolistic 
competition trade model of DIXIT and STIGLITZ 
(1977) and of KRUGMAN (1980). Monopolistic com-
petition is not the only model that can be used to 
Figure 1.  EU15 beer production, trade and trade 
over production 
Source: authors’ computation from FAOSTAT 
 
Figure 2.  EU15 wine production, trade, and trade 
over production 
Source: authors’ computation from FAOSTAT 
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Table 2.  Plants, production, and market share in the host country of three big players in the  
European beer market 
  Heineken Ab Inbev Carlsberg 
Country # plants 
Own brand 
production in 
host countries 
Market 
Share # plants 
Own brand 
production in 
host countries 
Market 
Share # plants 
Own brand 
production in 
host countries 
Market 
Share 
Belgium 3 No  11.3% 4 n.a. 57.6% 
France 3 Yes 27.6% 0 No 10.0% 3 Yes 32.0% 
Italy 4 Yes 31.3% 0 No 8.0% 1 Yes 8.0% 
The Netherlands 4 n.a. 46.9% 2 Yes 15.8% 
Finland 2 Yes 27.9% 1 Yes 50.0% 
Germany 11* No  n.a. 5 Yes 9.4% 4 Yes 3.0% 
Spain 4 Yes 29.1% 
United Kingdom 5 Yes 26.5% 3 Yes 21.8% 2 Yes 14.4% 
Greece 3 Yes 71.9% 1 No 11.0% 
Russia 10 Yes 15.8% 10 Yes 39.7% 
Denmark             1 n.a. 62.0% 
Notes: * Heineken in Germany has capital in local breweries but does not produce its own brand.  
Source: authors’ computation is based on information on the firms’ website and other sources. 
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derive a gravity-like equation.6 However, it is perhaps 
the most appropriate to model international trade in 
wine and beer, given the high level and growing im-
portance of intra-industry trade in these sectors. In the 
derivation of the gravity model presented in this pa-
per, the structure proposed by HEAD and MAYER 
(2000) offers the advantage of estimating the border 
effect in a rigorous framework by explicitly taking 
into account of the role of preferences.   
3.1  A Theory Based Gravity-Like Equation  
The model set-up combines consumer CES utility 
function with ‘iceberg’ trade costs and the property of 
the monopolistic competition trade model a la Dixit-
Stiglitz-Krugman (D-S-K).  
Therefore, let mij be the value of imports of coun-
try i from j, and  > 1 be the elasticity of substitution 
between home and foreign varieties. ij, is used to 
denote the ‘iceberg’ trade costs that include all the 
transaction costs associated with moving goods across 
space and national borders, with ii = 1 and ij  1. 
These trade costs determine the country i delivery 
price, pij = pj ij, for a product imported from j. vj de-
fines the value of production in j, and Yi the country i 
consumers total expenditure on goods from all sources 
(varieties) k, including domestic sources. Then, the 
(log) value of bilateral imports of country i from j is  
(1)
  
   


k ikkpkvika
ijajp
ijjviYijm



11log
log)1(log
log)1(logloglog
 
where the term aij is the preferences country i con-
sumers’ for country j products. The first two terms in 
the bilateral imports equation (1) capture the effect of 
country size. The third term captures the effect of 
bilateral trade costs, while the fourth and fifth terms 
respectively capture international differences in prices 
and preferences. The final term is the log summation 
of some highly non-linear terms relating to variables 
of all countries, and comes from the denominator of 
the CES price index. The correct estimation of the 
                                                            
6  The first theoretical derivation of a gravity-like model was 
made by ANDERSON (1979). DEARDORFF (1998) derived gravity 
equations from the Heckscher-Ohlin model, BERGSTRAND 
(1989) from models with monopolistic competition, while  
EATON and KORTUM (2002) derived theirs from Ricardian 
models. See ANDERSON and VAN WINCOOP (2004) for a review 
of this literature. 
bilateral import equation (1) needs to take account of 
the influence of this unobserved non-linear term that 
clearly depends on parameters that are already in the 
equation to be estimated.  However, the interesting 
manipulation first proposed by HEAD and MAYER 
(2000) working with the so-called log odds ratio spec-
ification can be followed.7  
To do this, j = i in equation (1) simply needs to 
be set to allow an equation for country imports from 
itself, log(mii). Then, the elimination of the non linear 
unobserved price index of the importing country as 
well as its total expenditure will be obtained by sub-
tracting the specification of the country’s imports 
from itself from equation (1), yielding  
(2)
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Equation (2) establishes a relationship between the 
relative amount consumers spend on foreign and do-
mestic goods and their relative price net of transport 
costs, and represents the theoretical counterpart of the 
empirical gravity-like specification used in this paper. 
3.2  Empirical Specification  
Before deriving an estimable equation, it is necessary 
to model both the trade costs and the preference com-
ponent of equation (2). Two elements of bilateral 
trade costs are considered: physical transport costs, dij, 
proportional to distances from i and j, and costs due to 
the presence of an international border, bij. Thus, the 
trade costs function will be equal to ijijij bd
  , where 
(bij  1) is the tariff equivalent of all trade barriers 
associated with the presence of an international bor-
der, and  is the distance elasticity.  
In the specification of consumer preferences, aij, 
it is simply assumed that consumers prefer goods pro-
duced in a contiguous country (Cij) and that the shar-
ing of cultural features (Lij) generates greater similari-
ty in taste. Lij and Cij are two dummy variables that 
take a value 1 when country i and country j (for i j) 
                                                            
7  Another theoretically-consistent way of estimating equation 
(1), but under symmetric assumptions about trade costs and 
preferences, is to follow ANDERSON and VAN WINCOOP (2003) 
and FEENSTRA (2004), including fixed effects for source and 
destination countries. 
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speak a common language and/or share a common 
border (0 otherwise).  
Plugging in (2) the specifications of the trade 
costs and for simplicity omitting the consumer prefer-
ence proxies Lij and Cij yields the following log odds 
specification of the (relative) bilateral trade equation 
(3)
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Equation (3) represents our basic specification to infer 
the border effect in the EU beer and wine markets. 
Taking the antilog of the estimated border dummy 
coefficients, exp(), that is, the constant term in the 
equation (3), gives the border effect of the respective 
trade flow considered, namely the degree to which 
intra-country trade exceeds international trade after 
controlling for size, transport costs, preferences, and 
relative prices. Note that the border dummy capture 
both the average level of border related costs of the 
importing country and any other unspecified trade 
costs between i and j, such as unspecified preferences 
or other supply side factors like the home market  
effect.  
Equation (3) is estimated by OLS because this 
environment does not have zero trade flows since in 
order to estimate the border effect, beer and wine pro-
duction data are requires so that the intra-country 
trade flows can be measured (see below). Consequent-
ly, this is only possible in countries with some level of 
production. All countries producing beer or wine in 
the EU-15 sample presented in this paper have export-
ed at least a small quantity to other EU-15 producers. 
This is why the gravity estimate in this study do not 
suffer from standard selection bias problems due to 
zero trade flows, and thus do not require a more com-
plex estimation procedure such as the Heckman two 
step estimator.8   
Finally, it is important to note that the relative na-
ture of the odd gravity specification used here is like a 
first-difference panel model estimator – and thus 
equivalent to a fixed effects specification – that, noto-
riously, increases the variance to be explained com-
                                                            
8  Given the logarithmic trasformation of the gravity equa-
tion, in presence of (many) zero trade flows, the OLS 
estimator can indeed bias the results due to sample se-
lection problems.  
pared to the estimations in levels (see COMBES et al., 
2005). Consequently, we expect lower explanatory 
power compared to traditional or fixed effect gravity 
specifications as the variables are computed as differ-
ences compared to internal flow used as the reference. 
3.3  Hypotheses Testing  
The following procedure was used to test the hypothe-
ses formulated about the role played by consumer 
preferences for home goods and the Home market 
effect. First of all, the average border effect for the 
EU-15 members was estimated by running the gravity 
equation (3) separately for wine and beer. Secondly, a 
specific control for consumer preference was intro-
duced into the model. Specifically, the stock of immi-
grants in country i from j was added, measured as the 
share of the native population of the importer country 
i. As recently shown by BRATTI et al. (2012), this 
variable should capture the consumer preference com-
ponent of the border. To the extent to which immigra-
tion affects trade flows primarily through preferences, 
then a reduction of the border effect proportional to 
the role played by preference should be detected. 
Therefore, let  the border coefficients estimated 
after controlling for the share of immigrants. Then, the 
variation in the border effect will be measured as: 
1)exp(  HB .  
It is expected that HBWine > HBBeer, namely the 
reduction in the border effect due to consumer prefer-
ences is expected to be higher for wine than beer. This 
is because the increase in the demand for country of 
origin wine (immigration effect) in the wine sector 
should translate directly into an increase in trade 
flows, ceteris paribus. In contrast, this effect should 
be lower in the beer sector because the increased de-
mand induced by immigration can be partially satis-
fied from the host country production of the foreign 
beer. Similarly, we can also measure the trade creation 
effect induced by immigration. Following COMBES et 
al. (2005) this is measured as )( ijX , where ijX is the 
average share of immigrants from j to i in the sample, 
and   is the estimated coefficient of the immigrant 
variable. 
Next, the following procedure was used to test 
the second hypothesis, namely, whether or not the 
HME is only relevant in explaining the beer border 
effect. Firstly, we classify each EU-15 country as 
“wine-drinking nations” or “beer-drinking nations” on 
the basis of their respective consumption and produc-
tion patterns of wine and beer (see data section). 
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Then, specific border coefficients for wine (beer)-
drinking nations were estimated for both the beer and 
wine gravity models and the corresponding other 
groups of countries. If the HME is only relevant in 
explaining the beer border effect, the following results 
is to be expected:  
 HBBeer-drinking-nations  < HBOther-countries-group, 
 HBWine-drinking-nations  > HBOther-countries-group. 
This is the result of two differentiated effects. Firstly, 
as a consequence of the HME, in beer drinking na-
tions like Germany or Belgium there is an over-
production capacity that is exported abroad. Conse-
quently, the border effect for those countries where 
the production takes place should be relatively small. 
Secondly, as an effect of FDI in beer, an important 
part of intra-national trade in the “other-countries 
group” will be satisfied by foreign production in the 
host country (see table 2), generating an 'artificial' 
increase of the border effect. The situation is different 
in the wine sector. Indeed, intra-national trade will be 
very low (low internal production) for countries that 
lie in the “other-countries group”, and most of the 
wine consumption can be only satisfied through im-
ports, generating a relatively lower border effect. 
4  Data and Variables  
The data required to implement equation (3) primarily 
involves bilateral exports and production data in a 
comparable industry classification. The bilateral ex-
port data for beer and wine come from the EURO-
STAT Comext database. In contrast, production data 
are taken from the EUROSTAT Prodcom database. 
The annual data for EU-15 countries for the years 
2000-2009 was collected.9 
Intra-country trade data was also need to estimate 
home bias. However, these figures were not available 
for the EU countries. As is frequently found in the 
literature, a country’s ‘imports’ from itself are calcu-
lated as the difference between total production and 
                                                            
9  The investigation is limited to the EU-15 countries (instead of 
EU-25) for both practical and conceptual reasons. Firstly, in 
order to estimate the border effect, production data to measure 
intra-country trade is needed. However, this data is lacking for 
many of the New Member States and years covered by the 
analysis. Secondly, conceptually, the EU enlargement of 2004 
to include the New Member States represents a trade integra-
tion episode with a direct effect on the magnitude of the bor-
der effects. This ‘policy shock’ introduces a potential con-
founding effect with respect to the main purpose of the analysis.  
total exports to the rest of the world (WEI, 1996). 
Moreover, other explanatory variables such as interna-
tional and intra-country distances as well as other 
gravity-standard bilateral variables, e.g. common lan-
guage10 and contiguity, are collected from the Centre 
d’Etude Prospectives et d’Informations Internationales 
(CEPII) database.11 The empirical implementation of 
equation (3) also needs to control for relative price 
(importer to exporter price). However, this price term 
is problematic, first and foremost due to data con-
straints at sectoral level, and second because the price 
term is obviously endogenous to bilateral trade flows 
(see HEAD and MAYER, 2000). Consequently, this 
term is abstracted in the final specification. Note that 
while omitting the price term may clearly affect the 
absolute magnitude of the estimated border effects, it 
should also be noted that this is not a relevant problem 
for the identification strategy because it is largely 
based on variation of border effects, after the inclu-
sion of migration variables, or on the consideration of 
different country aggregations (see section 3.3).   
Furthermore, data for the bilateral stock of immi-
grants are obtained from OECD (see DUMONT et al., 
2010), and refers to 1999. Thus, because of the simul-
taneity between trade and immigration flows, using 
immigration values at the starting period of the analy-
sis strongly reduces problems of endogeneity bias. 
Moreover, the immigration data is used to both con-
sider the stock of total immigrants and also split ac-
cording to the level of education, in terms of primary, 
secondary, and tertiary, respectively. The underlying 
idea is that the level of education is positively corre-
lated with the income level of the immigrants, and 
could affect the preference patterns toward beer and 
wine consumption differently.   
Finally, production and consumption data (from 
FAO source) are used to classify the beer and wine 
drinking nations, respectively. ”Wine-drinking na-
tions” are: France, Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain, 
and the “Beer-drinking nations” are: Belgium, Ger-
many, Denmark, Ireland, the United Kingdom, and 
The Netherland.   
                                                            
10  Given the well known low variability of the language dummy 
among the EU countries, this dummy is stated as being equal 
to 1, when at least 5% of the population in the country consid-
ered speaks another EU language. 
11  See the CEPII distance database at  
http://www.cepii.fr/anglaisgraph/bdd/distances.htm. 
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5  Results 
Table 3 reports the results for the first hypothesis, that 
is, how much the preferences component of the border 
is relevant in the beer and wine markets. Columns (1) 
and (6) report the benchmark gravity equations for 
wine and beer, respectively. Generally speaking, the 
model works quite well. All the standard gravity co-
variates except one have the expected sign and are 
very significant. Relative production has a positive 
and significant effect on bilateral trade flows, with an 
estimated coefficient of less than one, but nevertheless 
very similar for both the beer and wine sectors. Work-
ing at product level, an estimated production coeffi-
cient of less than 1 can be considered to be a standard 
result (OLPER and RAIMONDI, 2008a). The distance 
coefficient is negative and very significant, with an 
order of magnitude in the range of actual estimates. 
As expected, the distance coefficient in the beer sector 
is 26% higher in absolute value than that of wine 
(0.91 vs. 0.72), confirming our conjectures about 
the magnitude of transport costs in the two sectors. 
Regarding the wine sector, two countries sharing a 
common border tend to trade 153% (exp(0.93)1) 
more than otherwise, a value that reaches 228% 
(exp(1.19)1) in the beer sector. In contrast, while 
sharing the same language has a negative effect for 
wine but a positive one for beer, both coefficients are 
never significantly different from zero. This result is 
probably due to multicollinearity between the contigu-
ity and language dummies as in the sample, the EU 
member countries that share a common language also 
share a common land border, with the exception of 
Belgium and Austria. 
In terms of the estimated border effect in the 
wine sector, intra-national trade is about 9.5 (exp(2.25)) 
times higher than international trade. The same value 
for beer is 117.9 (exp(4.77)). Therefore, as expected 
the home bias in beer is of several order of magnitude 
greater than that of wine, suggesting a huge difference 
in the level of trade integration between the two sectors, 
a result in line with the causal observation discussed 
above. So what are the reasons for these big differences? 
This intriguing question is answered by first ana-
lysing the role of consumer preferences. The stock of 
immigrants is added to the specification in columns 
(2) and (7). Its estimated coefficient is positive and 
very significant, confirming that immigration is an 
important determinant of bilateral trade flows. The 
average trade creation effect of immigration is equals 
to 141% for wine and 101% for beer, values that pre-
sent the same order of magnitude as the findings of 
COMBES et al. (2005) and OLPER and RAIMONDI 
(2008a), who found an average migrant effect of ap-
Table 3.  Border effect and preferences in wine and beer: regression results 
  WINE BEER 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Log relative production  0.63*** 0.57*** 0.51*** 0.60*** 0.59*** 0.58*** 0.54*** 0.57*** 0.52*** 0.51*** 
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
Log relative distance  -0.72*** -0.60*** -0.43*** -0.69*** -0.68*** -0.91*** -0.77*** -0.83*** -0.76*** -0.69*** 
(0.11) (0.10) (0.10) (0.11) (0.11) (0.09) (0.10) (0.10) (0.09) (0.10) 
Contiguity 0.93*** 0.42 0.26 0.61* 0.50 1.19*** 0.92*** 1.04*** 0.93*** 0.91*** 
(0.35) (0.35) (0.34) (0.36) (0.34) (0.18) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) 
Common language -0.14 -0.37 -0.26 -0.41 -0.61 0.36 0.20 0.30 0.10 -0.03 
(0.47) (0.42) (0.41) (0.42) (0.41) (0.24) (0.24) (0.24) (0.24) (0.24) 
Home Bias -2.25*** -2.04*** -1.85*** -1.45*** -1.09*** -4.77*** -4.86*** -4.72*** -4.40*** -4.29*** 
(0.41) (0.37) (0.35) (0.42) (0.39) (0.26) (0.26) (0.26) (0.25) (0.25) 
Log immigrant-total   0.48***     0.27***   
  (0.06)     (0.05)   
Log immigrant-primary   0.58***     0.13***   
  (0.05)     (0.04)   
Log immigrant-secondary   0.35***     0.34***   
  (0.06)     (0.05)   
Log immigrant-tertiary   0.50***   0.46*** 
  (0.07)   (0.06) 
Obs. 546 546 546 546 546 1259 1259 1259 1259 1259 
R2 0.54 0.59 0.62 0.57 0.59 0.28 0.30 0.29 0.31 0.32 
Immigration effects (%)         
A Home Bias   -18.9 -33.0 -55.1 -68.7   9.4 -4.9 -30.9 -38.1 
Trade creation    141.3 107.4 83.0 58.2   110.1 95.8 74.2 56.8 
Notes: OLS regressions; in parenthesis robust standard errors (see text). *, **, and *** indicate significant level at 10%, 5% and 1% 
level, respectively. 
Source: authors’ estimation, see text 
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proximately 75%. A similar effect is detected in terms 
of border effect reduction, equal to 73% for wine but 
only 41% for beer. The latter result suggests that pref-
erences represent a very important determinant of the 
border costs, especially in the wine market. Moreover, 
note that when controlling for immigration, a strong 
reduction in the contiguity effect is also detected but 
only for wine, where the estimated coefficient is no 
longer significant. 
After controlling for total immigration, the residual 
of border effect is examined. The home bias in the 
wine sector, equal to only 2.5 (exp(0.93)), has largely 
disappeared, while the home bias in beer, equal to 
68.7 (exp(4.25)), is still very high. Therefore, to the 
extent to which immigration controls for preference, 
this is a clear indication that preference represents a 
key component of the border effect in the wine mar-
ket, but not for beer where other determinants of the 
border are at work, ceteris paribus.  
The subsequent columns of table 3 test whether 
or not the effect of migration on the border effect 
could also be related to the ‘quality’ of immigrants in 
terms of education level. Interestingly, migrant stock 
with tertiary schooling matters the most in both the 
beer and wine markets. There is a possible interpreta-
tion of this result in terms of income effect: the more 
educated people are, on average, better informed 
about product characteristics. If imported products are 
of superior quality and thus more expensive, as the 
growing literature on trade has recently shown (see 
BALDWIN and HARRIGAN, 2011; CURZI and OLPER, 
2012), it is not surprising to find that migrants with 
tertiary schooling exert the strongest reduction effect 
on the preference component of the border. Finally, 
note that when tertiary schooling is considered, the 
wine border effect totally disappears, reinforcing the 
idea that preferences explain the bulk of the wine bor-
der effect. 
Next, table 4 investigates the second hypothesis 
as to whether or not the HME could represent a poten-
tial explanation for the big border effect detected in 
the beer market. In order to do this, regressions were 
run splitting the country sample into “wine (beer)-
drinking nations” and “other” countries, respectively. 
As discussed above, the hypothesis is that as an effect 
of the HME, “beer-drinking nations” should present 
an over-production capacity that is exported abroad. 
Consequently, the border effect is expected to be rela-
tively small for those countries where high production 
takes place. In contrast, exactly the opposite result 
should be expected in the wine sector, that is, “wine-
drinking nations” should have a relatively high border 
effect compared to other countries due to consumer 
preferences for home goods. 
The most relevant regressions are reported in 
columns (2) and (5), while regressions in columns (1) 
Table 4.  Border effect and home market effect in wine and beer: regression results 
  WINE BEER 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Log relative production  0.63*** 0.66*** 0.59*** 0.58*** 0.57*** 0.53*** 
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
Log relative distance  -0.72*** -0.75*** -0.62*** -0.91*** -0.80*** -0.66*** 
(0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.09) (0.09) (0.10) 
Contiguity 0.93*** 1.19*** 0.62* 1.19*** 1.15*** 0.88*** 
(0.35) (0.35) (0.36) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) 
Common language -0.14 -0.69 -0.72 0.36 0.33 0.16 
(0.47) (0.49) (0.45) (0.24) (0.24) (0.24) 
Log immigrant-total   0.46***   0.27*** 
  (0.06)   (0.05) 
Home Bias         
   Benchmark -2.25***   -4.77***   
(0.41)   (0.26)   
   Wine (beer) drinking nations   -2.78*** -1.34***   -3.93*** -3.40*** 
  (0.41) (0.41)   (0.26) (0.27) 
   Others   -1.86*** -0.74*   -5.20*** -4.67*** 
  (0.42) (0.40)   (0.28) (0.28) 
Obs. 546 546 546 1259 1259 1259 
R2 0.54 0.55 0.60 0.28 0.29 0.32 
Notes: OLS regressions; in parenthesis robust standard errors (see text). *, **, and *** indicate significant levels at the 10%, 5% and 1% 
level, respectively. 
Source: authors’ estimation, see text 
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and (4) are benchmarks for comparison. What these 
additional regressions show is that traditional wine 
producers in the wine sector tend to have a border 
effect of about 16.1 (exp(2.78)), that is, more than 
twice as high as that of the other countries, equal to 
6.4 (exp(1.86)). In contrast and in line with the hy-
pothesis, exactly the opposite result is detected in the 
beer sector. Indeed, the border effect for the tradition-
al beer producers is equal to 50.9 (exp(3.93)), thus 
more than three times lower than that of the other 
countries group, where it reaches about 181 (exp(5.20)), 
just what the home market effect hypothesis should 
predict. This counterintuitive effect is due to the fact 
that in the “other-countries group”, as an effect of F 
DI in beer, an important part of intra-national trade 
will be satisfied by foreign production in the host 
country, generating an 'artificial' increase in the border 
effect. Finally, note that similar results are also detected 
when we control for the stock of immigrants (see  
columns (3) and (6)). 
In summary, the evidence above broadly con-
firms the hypotheses. Firstly, the estimated border 
effect in the wine sectors in the EU-15 is largely at-
tributable to home bias in preferences. Secondly, 
while preferences are still relevant in the beer sector, 
the magnitude of the border effect primarily appears 
to be explained by firm localization choices and the 
resulting home market effect in an environment where 
trade costs matter.  
6  Conclusions 
This paper re-examines the trade reduction effect in-
duced by national border focusing on two particular 
sectors of the food industry: the beer and wine mar-
kets. More specifically, several apriori expectations 
about the determinants of border effect across the EU-
15 countries were formulated. By exploiting the het-
erogeneity in trade costs, internationalization behav-
iour, and production characteristics of the two sectors, 
empirical evidence was found for attributing part of 
the border effect differences in the beer and wine 
trade to the home market effect. Indeed, in the wine 
sector, where the HME effect should be irrelevant, it 
was found that consumer preferences play an im-
portant role, captured here by immigration flows. In 
contrast, albeit the preference component is still im-
portant in the beer industry, the bulk of the border 
effect explanation is attributable to the home market 
effect, that is, firms tend to locate near the consumers 
to minimize trade costs, endogenously increasing the 
border effect. 
These findings may have potential implications 
for both business and policy makers. Firstly, there is 
clear evidence that international trade plays a more 
prominent role in the wine industry than it does for 
beer, suggesting that free trade agreements, together 
with quality standards like labeling schemes, can fur-
ther increase trade integration and welfare. The fact 
that the level of trade integration in the EU is signifi-
cantly higher than in the world market, supports this 
conclusion.12 Secondly, FDI emerges as a prominent 
firm strategy in the beer market to expand influence 
abroad, which is also a reaction to high beer transport 
costs. Therefore, it is the regulatory environment and 
international (bilateral) agreement on capital flow that 
matters the most in facilitating further market integra-
tion. Finally, given the documented influence of 
transport costs in beer, technological innovation in 
this sector appears to be a fundamental strategy to 
increase international trade integration.   
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